Tag Archives: Judge Sweet

Sweet!! The Judge Rules on the Myriad Patent Case

On Monday, Judge Robert Sweet of the Federal District Court in Southern New York shocked the world by ruling against Myriad Genetics, invalidating claims with regard to patents on BRCA 1 and 2.  This morning, the genetic counselors, oncologists, patients and their families as well as other interested parties like patent lawyers and venture capitalists are wondering: what does it mean, really?

 The ACLU and other parties sued Myriad in 2009, claiming their patents interfered with medical care for families concerned about hereditary breast and ovarian cancer by stifling innovation that might lead to better tests and denying them access to an alternate lab to double check or compare results.  In addition, the lawsuit challenged the idea of gene patenting, suggesting that DNA sequences were a part of nature and that they were discovered rather than invented, and therefore were not in their essence eligible for patenting.  For their part, Myriad maintained that the patent covered not DNA as it appeared in nature, but the isolated gene product that was tested in the laboratory.  This is concept – that purified or isolated DNA is effectively a chemical made by man — underlies many, many patents granted over the past 20 years or so, and Myriad was widely expected to win the case easily.

 But they did not.  Not to get too carried away – the case will be appealed and all the same experts who predicted that it would be dismissed are now predicting that it will be overturned.  But were it to stand, would it change the facts on the ground for consumers of BRCA 1 and 2 testing?  The short answer is, probably not.  The ruling struck down parts of 7 patents relating to BRCA testing; Myriad holds an additional 16 patents on BRCA testing (this might shed some light on the bewildering fact that there are over 40,000 patents on human genes, meaning that gene patents outnumber genes by a factor of nearly two to one).

 Still, the ruling is likely to have a profound effect long term, as it puts industry and investors on notice that the law surrounding patent protection of genes and gene tests is far from settled.  One question that has been debated since the beginning of this lawsuit is whether or not patents on gene sequence (or their moral equivalent, patents on cDNA sequence, which the judge correctly identified as being different only in a petty and legalistic sense) promote or interfere with development of diagnostics, treatments, or cures for genetic disease.

 This is really the million dollar question.  Promoting innovation is the point of patents; it is the sine qua non of the whole patent deal.  It is tempting, but fatally wrong, to think of patenting as a system of social justice, ensuring that the deserving individuals receive the benefits of their labor and/or inspiration.  This is lovely, but false. A patent is not a right, like free speech or pursuit of happiness.  An individual or a corporation has no right to demand that the government throw its weight behind protecting their intellectual property.  Without a patent, they can protect their intellectual property simply by keeping it secret, like the formula for Coke.  In fact, one part of the deal when you get a patent is that you agree to make the information public.  This, in addition to making new ideas lucrative, is how patents are designed to promote innovation.  In this way, it is reasoned, we are spared the wasted energy of reinventing the wheel, and can go on to the society-enhancing process of improving our brakes, or our steering, or our floor mats.  (Are you listening, Toyota?)

 This ruling (maybe temporarily) invalidates sequence as the point at which a patent can be applied, a standard that might then be considered in other patent cases (or it might not.  Judge Sweet’s decision sets a precedent, but it doesn’t change any laws).  It leaves the door open for patents to be acquired for subsequent steps, such as testing methods or diagnostic algorithms (think Mammoprint).  The hope of many who argue against patents on sequence is that by eliminating the obstacle of a patent at this early stage, it will allow for more open and vigorous research to continue after the gene discovery phase, leading to more success in the development of diagnostics and treatments.  Which is, after all, what the whole thing is supposed to be about.

 For many years, the research system was divided, roughly, into basic science, which was generally funded by government or philanthropic sources and generally took place in academic settings, and commercial applications, which were generally funded by industry with a profit motive.  In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which actively encouraged universities to pursue patents and academic-industry partnerships, so that more of the government investment in science might be translated into advancements available to consumers.  As hoped, the number of patents resulting from NIH-backed science soared.  Bayh-Dole was very successful in promoting commercial use of scientific research; at the same time, it broke down the imaginary wall between academia and commercial interests, with consequences for everything from collegial information sharing to the dynamics of peer review that we are still sorting out today.  For example, it used to be a given that patents were not enforced in research settings.  Today, however, academics are routinely vested in companies, while companies often fund joint ventures with universities.  Companies are less inclined to wink at patent infringement in research when they see Washington University or UCSF as proxies for Monsanto or Genentech.

 But theoretically, a changing patent landscape could shift genetic research back in the direction of earlier models, with basic gene identification done mainly in academic settings using NIH or other public funding.  Detractors say that academic curiosity alone cannot drive discovery at the same pace as the dangling of dollar signs; others point to examples where research has been robust even without the financial inducement of an exclusive, patent-protected, market edge.  I am inclined to believe that intellectual curiosity and the desire to discover can do great things among the science-minded, but then, hell, I have always been a crazy optimist.  I mean, against all the odds in the world, I thought we could pass health care reform just because it was the right thing to do.

 Crazy, right?

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